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Many people are now asking whether 
we must passively await the predict- 
able escalation of disaster from the 
politics of hate and fear to crisis, geno- 
cide, and gigantic flows of refugees 
which, in turn, lead to hunger, thirst, 
epidemics, the erosion of regions, and 
destabilization of governments. 
I think not. These are not inevitable 
phenomena, like earthquakes, but are 
man-made calamities. We are witness- 
ing the casualties of the old order of 
bystander states refusing to take steps 
to thwart genocide (or stop it in its 
early stages), justifying their absten- 
tionby the lackof national interest, and 
paying enormous costs to put 
bandaids on the living casualties. The 
casualties include the millions of dead, 
wounded, raped, maimed, and the 
homeless-refugees and internal ex- 
iles. Studies show that the overwhelm- 
ing majority of refugees-over 16 
million by the end of 1993 (not includ- 
ing the refugees from Rwanda)-are 
created by states committing genocide 
and gross violations of human rights. 
My thesis is that genocide is pre- that it is not deterred by other coun- 
ventable (as are political mass mur- tries-indeed, the patrons of the per- 
ders), because it is usually a rational petrators often aid them. Although 
act. That is, the perpetrators calculate there is much the international com- 
the likelihood of success, given their munity could do were there the will, 
values and objectives. One of the rea- we should, for practical purposes, fo- 
sons genocide is likely to succeed is cus first on joint and individual actors 
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rather than on international organiza- 
tions who could step in to deter geno- 
cide. In the contemporary world this 
usually means patrons, donors, and 
allies. 
The rationality of the perpetrators is 
sometimes overlooked because of the 
often dramatic mobilization of fear, 
hatred, and aggression. Genocide is 
committed from many motives: ideo- 
logical, retributive (to prevent or re- 
spond to a threat), and economic. 
Genocide is the calculated murder of a 
segment or all of a group defined as 
being outside of the universe of obliga- 
tion of the perpetrator, in response to a 
crisis believed to be caused by the vic- 
tims, or an opportunity seen to be im- 
peded by them. Crises and opportuni- 
ties may be a result of war, challenges 
to the structure of domination, the 
threat of internal breakdown, or social 
revolution and economic develop- 
ment. Since 1945, most genocides have 
been state responses to rebellions or 
challenges by ethnic groups excluded 
from power, i.e., challenges to the 
structure of domination. War was of- 
ten a precursor or consequence of 
genocide (Fein 1993). 
Rwanda is another example of a 
modal pattern. The perpetrators repre- 
sent an elite or segment of the domi- 
nant ethnic group that felt threatened 
Letter to the Editor from the Jewish 
Civil Rights Educational Founda- 
tion of Canada 
In your August-September 1994 edi- 
tion you quote the statistical summary 
of various countries' claims and status. 
I am absolutely outraged that 268 ap- 
plicants would be or could be declared 
as refugees by Canada's Immigration 
and Refugee Board. I plain and simply 
reject the suggestion that Israel is a 
country from which there could be le- 
gitimate refugees. Any citizen of Israel 
is free to come and go as [slhe pleases. 
Israel is a democracy that respects the 
rule of law. There are human rights 
commissions, there is an Ombudsman 
and there is, of course, a highly sophis- 
ticated court structure to which all citi- 
zens and even non-citizens have 
access. 
I have travelled to Israel many times 
and have participated in legal semi- 
nars and if there is one constant with 
which I have come away it is the total 
independence of the Judiciary and its 
absolute commitment to the preserva- 
tion of individual human rights. 
I served as Chairman for twenty 
years of Canadian Lawyers 4 Jurists 
for Soviet Jewry and have visited the 
Soviet Union on four occasions. From 
countless contacts with citizens of the 
former Soviet Union, Jewish and non- 
Jewish it was obvious to me that many 
considered emigration to Israel as a 
convenient vehicle to get to the United 
States or Canada. That in no way di- 
minished their legitimacy in wanting 
to escape anti-Semitism, persecution 
and the violation of fundamental hu- 
man rights in the Soviet Union. Many 
that were successful in gaining en- 
trance to Israel then simply fled to the 
United States or Canada for economic 
considerations but evidently per- 
suaded certain members of the Immi- 
gration and Refugee Board that they 
were legitimate refugees. 
It is important for the credibility of 
the Immigration and Refugee Board 
that its decisions are based on accurate, 
honest and factual criteria. It seems to 
me that those members who granted 
refugee status to 268 applicants could 
use a basic course about Israel's demo- 
cratic institutions and perhaps some 
insight into the realities of what consti- 
tutes a totalitarian, autocratic, or racist 
regime. To equate Israel with countries 
such as Iran, Iraq and Sudan is not only 
odious but it is simply preposterous. 
In the process it demeans the high re- 
gard to which the Board should aspire 
and it mocks the true definition of a 
refugee. 
Bert Raphael, Q.C. 
President, Jewish Civil Rights 
Educational Foundation of Canada, 
Toronto. 
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by imposition of a new structure in 
which their ethnic-group class inter- 
ests could be subordinated. Although 
the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi be- 
tween the Hutu and the Tutsi is fre- 
quently cast in a tribal or caste context, 
it is better understood as that of com- 
peting ethnic groups. The ranking and 
status of members of both groups was 
rigidified by the Belgian colonizers, 
who co-opted the Tutsi as administra- 
tors and soldiers and prevented indi- 
vidual mobility by mandating the use 
of identity cards. 
The current crisis in Rwanda was 
instigated by responses to the negoti- 
ated settlement between the govern- 
ment and the Tutsi exile-led Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) after its invasion 
in 1990. The settlement authorized the 
return of Tutsi refugees, who had fled 
genocidal massacres in Rwanda in 
1962, and the sharing of power with 
them in a transitional government 
prior to elections. The refugees-now 
500,000 persons-added one to every 
13.6 Rwandans in the most densely 
populated country in Africa (257 per- 
sons per square kilometer). This must 
have signified more intense competi- 
tion for resources in the future. 
The donor states and international 
aid organizations pressed the govern- 
ment to accede to the agreement. Presi- 
dent Habyarimana played a double 
game, pretending he would imple- 
ment it but bringing into the govern- 
ment an extremist anti-Tutsi party, the 
Coalition for the Defense of the Repub- 
lic (CDR). One observer, Roger Winter, 
Director of the US Committee for Refu- 
gees, has called the CDR "Rwanda's 
version of the Ku Klux Klan" (1994). 
The presidents of both Rwanda and 
Burundi were eliminated in an plane 
crash on April 6,1994--an act the Hutu 
extremists blamed on the RPF and the 
Tutsi, but outside observers attributed 
to the extremists. This was followed by 
a coup of the extremists, who mur- 
dered the next-in-line Hutu leaders 
whom they did not trust and organ- 
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ized the massacres by military, party, 
and youth organizations against the 
Tutsi, and extrajudicial executions of 
the moderate Hutu. 
The period preceding the genocide 
in Rwanda was marked by the mobili- 
zation of hatred and fear against the 
victims, including (in Rwanda) public 
injunctions broadcast on the radio to 
kill Tutsi. Politicians mobilizing their 
constituency in Rwanda, as elsewhere, 
could remind their communities that 
members of the Other had committed 
crimes against their people. The Hutu 
could remember the genocide the Tutsi 
minority military leaders perpetrated 
in neighbouring Burundi in 1972 
against educated Hutu, the subse- 
quent massacres, and the assassination 
of the first democratically electedHutu 
president of Burundi in 1993 by coup- 
makers in the Tutsi-dominated army. 
It was in this early period of crisis 
(during the weakening of the state in 
Rwanda from RPF attacks) that pa- 
trons and allies had the greatest oppor- 
tunity to deter the genocide. 
The Rwandan government received 
arms to wage the conflict with the RPF 
from France, Egypt, and South Africa. 
France especially fortified the army 
with weapons and leadership in re- 
sponse to the RPF invasion, which was 
backed by Uganda. The French have 
backed Rwanda uncritically until re- 
cently, largely because (by their ac- 
counts) of the desire to support 
French-speaking states which they see 
threatened by English-speaking states 
(such as Uganda). They could hardly 
be ignorant of the potential for geno- 
cide, for the President's paramilitary 
militia, the Akazu, had instigated mob 
killings of the Tutsi in 1990 in response 
to the RPF invasion. Uganda, which 
actively assisted the RPF, was acting 
not only from reciprocity (for the RPF 
had helped bring President Museveni 
to power), but from necessity, since 
refugees were in competition with 
Ugandans for land and water (Smyth 
1994). 
This adds to the cases in whichgeno- 
cide leads to war-as in Pakistan in 
1971 and Uganda in 1979-by creating 
great numbers of refugees-warriors, 
who can neither stay nor return home 
unless they dislodge the governments 
that led them to flee. War and rebel 
attacks against the state also often lead 
to genocide as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Burundi, ChinainTibet, Ethiopia, Iraq, 
and Rwanda, among others. 
The RPF were in sight of victory and 
settled for reinclusion. But reinclusion 
or reform could only succeed had the 
CDR and the Akazu and their follow- 
ers been isolated and firmly sup- 
pressed. Winters notes that, 
" [rlepeatedly, we have seen extremists 
in conflicts around the world use in- 
credible violence to forestall a peace 
they find unacceptable. We saw it most 
recently in Baruch Goldstein's slaugh- 
ter in Hebron, in imitation of Hamas's 
bloody strategy" (1993). 
To move from this issue to the gen- 
eral question of deterrence, several 
intiatives ought to be undertaken by 
concerned states and human rights 
organizations. We need to heighten the 
awareness of patrons and press them 
to prevent genocide by: a) coordinat- 
ing the promises of donors with re- 
spect to withdrawal of aid and making 
further aid contingent on observing 
life-integrity rights (not tolerating 
massacres, extrajudicial executions, 
"disappearances," or torture); b) iso- 
lating and suppressing extremist par- 
ties which resort to violence; c) 
promoting interdependent solutions; 
and d) warning the instigators that 
genocide will not pay. To do this, we 
have to make sure that it does not pay 
and stop paying off the perpetrators. 
The role of punishment is not only 
to establish responsibility, but to avoid 
the future stigma of group guilt which 
impairs trust and leads to cycles of 
crime-revenge-crime. Thus, punish- 
ment is essential to enable the children 
of the perpetrators and the victims to 
start anew, to share a common moral 
consensus. And if punishment cannot 
be enforced, judgements still serve a 
function by shaming the perpetrators. 
Such shame can be reinforced if other 
states vow not to honour them or per- 
mit them entry, thus marginalizing 
them in the eyes of the world. 
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In this case, it appears that the UN 
has authorized a rudimentary com- 
mission to investigate war crimes. This 
could be expanded to become an Afri- 
can-based international tribunal, or 
the tribunal charged with judging war 
crimes and genocide in Bosnia could 
be authorized to try genocide in 
Rwanda. Cohen has argued that it is 
imperative to try cases in Kigali rather 
than in Europe in order to assure the 
refugees' judgement will be made 
without bias and to give them enough 
security to return. 
Although there may be hope in 
Rwanda in view of the policy of the 
RPF against collective retaliation 
(Kasfir 1994), it is imperative to bring 
in as many human rights monitors as 
needed to oversee the return of the 
refugees and the trials. 
In the long run, we ought to create 
two key institutions on the interna- 
there funds available, they could cre- 
ate an international radio network, 
broadcasting in native languages, that 
would unmask disinformation and 
propaganda, unveil the motives of agi- 
tators of hate, and promote respect for 
human rights and peace. This is not 
beyond the reach of our technology or 
resources. 
The United States vacillated on rec- 
ognizing genocide in Rwanda and did 
not do anything to prevent it. Despite 
spending vast sums of money-which 
may well exceed $500 million- for 
humanitarian assistance in Rwanda, 
the United States has not made effec- 
tive use of its power and leadership. 
Preventive leadership to make the use 
of genocide a dangerous risk could 
save millions of lives and dollars. 
Warnings and deterrents ought to 
be backed up by a consistent policy of 
enforcement of existing American 
In order to judge, expose, and shame the perpetrators of genocide 
when it occurs, we need an international criminal court to prose- 
cute not only genocide but also terrorism and other international 
crimes. Such an institution should enable the victims to appeal 
directly to the court to order the perpetrators to stop . . . . 
tional level because, at present, victims 
and their representatives cannot in- 
voke the UN Genocide Convention in 
any way. The first institution is an in- 
ternational criminal court to which vic- 
tims and their representatives could go 
to prosecute offenders and ask for res- 
titution. Second, we need a UN rapid- 
response force, as Brian Urquhart 
recommended (1993), a force consist- 
ing of professional volunteers, answer- 
able to the Security Council (possible 
under the present structure), which 
can act immediately to halt or cordon 
off the perpetrators of genocide, so that 
we do not repeat the experiences of 
Bosnia and Rwanda: passing unen- 
forceable resolutions in the first case, 
and avoiding intervention while the 
genocide was in progress in the sec- 
ond. 
Much more could be done were the 
non-profit human rights movement 
and the media to act together. Were 
laws, which proscribe giving aid to 
state perpetrators of gross violations of 
human rights. This should be extended 
to the international level, mandating 
that the world lending institutions de- 
mand a Human Rights Impact State- 
ment as well as an Environmental 
Impact Statement. 
At the same time, the international 
community and private donors could 
reward states, such as South Africa, 
Israel, and possibly Northern Ireland, 
which rectify past policies of violation 
and negotiate an end to group con- 
flicts. In many cases, we could change 
the political environment of the poten- 
tial perpetrators directly and indi- 
rectly to make sure that they lack arms 
and are isolated. We s h d d   re vent 
the escalation of conflicts wherever 
possible and anticipate the effects of 
sustaining or breaking up  existing 
states. We could tie politicallegitimacy 
to the protection of human rights, mak- 
ing recognition of new states provi- 
sional for at least two years. 
In order to judge, expose, and shame 
the perpetrators of genocide when it 
occurs, we need an international crimi- 
nal court (as has been discussed) to 
prosecute not only genocide but also 
terrorism and other international 
crimes. Such an institution should en- 
able the victims (and organizations 
acting on their behalf) to appeal di- 
rectly to the court to order the perpe- 
trators to stop, to get restitution for the 
victims, and to make definitive histori- 
cal findings regarding responsibility. 
Were there such a court, the revival of 
the Khmer Rouge since 1979 and the 
restabilization of the regime of 
Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War 
might have been thwarted. 
There is a role for governments, 
international organizations, non- 
governmental human rights organiza- 
tions, and the media to play in 
implementing this agenda. For gov- 
ernments, it would mean placing in- 
ternational human rights above 
temporary advantages from trading 
with and arming abusive powers. The 
movement to change the taken-for- 
granted assumption, that sovereignty 
implies indifference to our neigh- 
bours' crimes (like respect for family 
implied overlooking child abuse next 
door), is yet to emerge from gestation 
in images of mass flight, chaos, blood, 
and death. 
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